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Interest of Amici Curiae 
 
The Ethics Bureau at Yale1
 
 is a clinic at 
Yale Law School composed of fourteen law students 
supervised by an experienced practicing lawyer, 
lecturer, and ethics professor. The Bureau has 
drafted amicus briefs in matters involving lawyer 
ethics and judicial conduct, assisted defense counsel 
with ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
implicating issues of professional responsibility, and 
provided assistance, counsel, and guidance on a pro 
bono basis to not-for-profit legal service providers, 
courts, and law schools.  
Additional amici curiae are the Louis Stein 
Center for Law and Ethics, as well as lawyers and 
scholars whose interests include the conduct of the 
judiciary and the codes that regulate judicial 
conduct. Because of the large number of amici, the 
names and brief descriptions of these individuals are 
attached as an appendix. 
 
Because the impartiality of the judicial 
process, a fundamental element of judicial ethics, 
has been placed at issue by the pending matter, 
amici believe they might assist the Court in 
resolving the important issues presented. 
 
                                                     
1 The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of Yale 
University or Yale Law School. Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the 
Rules of this Court, Petitioner and Respondent have consented 
to the filing of this brief. This brief was not written in whole or 
in part by counsel for any party, and no person or entity other 
than amici have made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation and submission of this brief. 
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Summary of Argument 
 
In our system of justice, judges possess and 
exercise tremendous power. With that power comes 
the obligation to maintain high standards of 
professional responsibility. Preserving fair and 
impartial courts is so fundamental that it is a 
constitutional guarantee under the Due Process 
Clause. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) 
(“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process.”). At times “the probability of actual 
bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow 
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). This case presents 
one of those circumstances. 
 
To give definition to this constitutional 
requirement, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
(“the Code”) promulgated by the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) was adopted, in relevant part, 
by forty-nine of the fifty state supreme courts as 
enforceable rules governing the conduct of each 
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state’s judges.2
                                                     
2 Forty-nine of fifty states adopted the 2000 Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of 
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55, 55 
(2000). Thereafter, thirty-two states adopted the 2007 revision 
of the Code, while fifteen others have established committees to 
do so. State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Am. B. Ass’n (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics
_regulation/map.html. Because the 2007 revision did not 
change the relevant Code provisions at issue in this case—the 
standards for impropriety, appearance of impropriety, and 
disqualification—these provisions have been adopted by forty-
nine states, regardless of whether some of these states have 
adopted the 2007 revision in full. See Mark I. Harrison, The 
2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a 
Generation of Judges, 28 Just. Sys. J. 257 (2007). 
 In writing the Code, the ABA 
recognized that the American judicial system is 
premised upon the “principle that an independent, 
impartial and competent judiciary . . . will interpret 
and apply the law that governs our society.” Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl. (2011). Most 
importantly, the Code does not suggest mere 
aspirational guidelines, but instead establishes 
strict, enforceable standards for the ethical conduct 
of judges and judicial candidates. Id. As such, the 
Code requires judges to make competent decisions in 
an impartial manner, untainted by personal bias or 
prejudice. 
 
 Pennsylvania has adopted the 2007 Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, which is referenced in this brief. In fact, 
Chief Justice Castille was a member of the Court that adopted 
and amended the Code of Judicial Conduct in both 2005 and 
2014. See Pa. Code of Judical Conduct Canons 1-4 (2014); see 
also Pa. Const. art. 5, § 10(c) (“[T]he Supreme Court shall have 
the power to prescribe rules governing . . . the conduct of all 
courts.”).  
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Judges who wear “two hats” in the same case 
violate the requirement of judicial impartiality. 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989). 
It is particularly egregious when a sitting judge 
continues to wear a prosecutor’s hat. See Gay v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 974, 975 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“[It is a] basic concept of due process of 
law that a person should not serve as both 
prosecutor and judge.”). In blatant violation of these 
principles, then-Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Ronald Castille refused to recuse 
himself despite having sought the death penalty in 
Mr. Terrance Williams’ prosecution while serving as 
District Attorney of Philadelphia. Wearing a 
prosecutor’s hat that was impossible to remove 
because of his personal stake and role as a lawyer  
in Mr. Williams’ case, Chief Justice Castille 
impermissibly sat on the bench when his Court 
reversed Mr. Williams’ successful petition for post-
conviction relief. 
 
As tempting as it might be, it is a per se 
violation of the Code for a prosecutor (or any lawyer, 
for that matter), having secured victory in the trial 
court and on direct appeal, to then sit as a judge on 
the court that adjudicates a challenge to that victory. 
In the view of amici, violations of the Code of this 
magnitude are clear evidence of a Due Process 
violation. Because there can be no dispute that the 
Code violations here are among the gravest found in 
the Code, Chief Justice Castille’s conduct deeply 
undermined the integrity of the judicial proceedings 
and trampled any notion of Due Process for Mr. 
Williams.  
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Argument 
 
I. By serving as prosecutor and then judge 
in the same case, Chief Justice Castille 
created a serious risk of actual bias by 
flouting his obligation to identify and 
avoid a forbidden conflict.  
 
A. District Attorney Castille’s 
personal involvement in the 
prosecution of Mr. Williams 
rendered him unable to later serve 
as a judge in Mr. Williams’ case.  
 
In order to decide their cases fairly and 
independently, judges are required by both Due 
Process and the Code to remain impartial and 
independent. This standard reflects the fundamental 
right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, to 
present one’s case to an impartial tribunal. 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876. Based on several prior 
decisions, Caperton mandated an objective standard 
to guarantee this right—“whether, ‘under a realistic 
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual 
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden.’” Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. 
at 47).  
 
This essential right is clearly endangered 
when a judge’s conscious or unconscious partiality 
threatens to “infect both the process and outcome of 
a trial.” Raymond McKoski, Disqualifying Judges 
When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be 
Questioned, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 411, 432 (2014). Indeed, 
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anything that might tempt a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict or lead the judge 
“not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between 
the State and the accused,” denies the accused the 
Due Process of law. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
532 (1927). 
 
 Chief Justice Castille had every reason to 
understand these obligations under both the Due 
Process Clause and the Code, but ignored them 
when he sat on a tribunal that decided the appeal of 
a case he began as District Attorney. A fundamental 
tenet of our adversarial system is the purposeful 
separation of the prosecutorial and judicial roles. 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (“[T]he 
strict requirements of neutrality cannot be the  
same for . . . prosecutors as for judges, . . . whose 
impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee of a 
fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional 
regime.”); United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (“There is also a critical difference 
between the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the 
government’s position and the judge’s role as an 
impartial arbiter and protector of the defendant’s 
rights.”).  
 
The ideal judge should be neutral and open-
minded, serving as a detached arbiter rather than a 
forceful advocate for one side in a case. Public 
Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) 
(explaining that a judge “must think dispassionately 
and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a 
case”); Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.2 cmt. 1 
(“To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a 
judge must be objective and open-minded.”). In 
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contrast, a prosecutor is involved in a case as a 
vigorous advocate for the government in an 
adversarial process. It would thus be “difficult if not 
impossible for such a judge to free himself from the 
influence of what took place” in his previous role as a 
prosecutor. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138. As a 
result, a prosecutor-turned-judge cannot be “wholly 
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those 
accused.” Id. at 137.  
 
 Psychological research on cognitive biases 
explains why a prosecutor cannot later serve as a 
neutral judge in the same case. When people are 
rewarded for their success in persuading others of 
the correctness of a position, they then become 
psychologically committed to that position and 
devote the majority of their mental effort to 
justifying it. E.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and 
Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: 
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 632, 633 (1989). This 
confirmation bias effect, known as defensive 
bolstering, makes people in such circumstances less 
likely to acknowledge the weaknesses of their 
positions and more likely to engage in self-
justification. Id.  
 
Empirical studies have also found that these 
inherent cognitive limitations make prosecutors 
more likely to minimize evidence inconsistent with 
their favored hypothesis—the defendant’s guilt—and 
to construe ambiguous information in a way that 
supports this hypothesis. Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe 
for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between 
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in 
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Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 999, 
1027-32 (2009). A prosecutor publicly stakes out the 
position that the defendant should be found guilty 
when he files charges, and the verdict is the only 
feedback he receives about the correctness of that 
decision. Id. at 1022-23. Due to the nature of the 
prosecutor’s ultimate task of publicly presenting an 
effective case for the defendant’s guilt, a prosecutor-
turned-judge would thus have to overcome powerful 
cognitive limitations to serve as a neutral, impartial 
judge in the same case in which he previously 
advocated, before the court and his community, for 
the correctness of his assessment of the defendant’s 
guilt.3
 
 
Here, Chief Justice Castille’s personal 
involvement in the prosecution of Mr. Williams 
compels the conclusion that he was subject to these 
cognitive limitations. As the District Attorney, he 
personally authorized the decision to seek the death 
penalty after he had already assessed the evidence 
against Mr. Williams and publicly committed 
himself to Mr. Williams’ guilt and to a death 
                                                     
3 This bias is likely exacerbated in the context of post-
conviction challenges. Scholars have identified institutional 
and psychological reasons why prosecutors may be unduly 
skeptical of such challenges; relevant factors include public 
pressure not to look “soft on crime,” fear of offending police or 
victims by appearing too defense-minded, and the prosecutor’s 
own personal commitment to the conviction. E.g., Bennett L. 
Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 13 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 309 (2001); Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The 
Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving 
Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 389 
(2002); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial 
Resistance to Post-Conviction Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125 
(2004). 
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sentence. Although he was not advocating before the 
jury in his role as the District Attorney, he was 
responsible for supervising the trial prosecutor who 
was found to have violated her Brady obligations, 
and he signed his name on the appellate brief his 
office filed to defend the death sentence it had 
obtained in Mr. Williams’ case. The psychological 
effects of cognitive bias and defensive bolstering 
apply perhaps even more powerfully to the District 
Attorney, an elected public official who was the face 
of his office’s decision to prosecute and seek the 
death penalty against Mr. Williams.  
 
Chief Justice Castille’s partiality was further 
compounded because his task was to evaluate the 
performance of his own law office and the lawyers he 
supervised in prosecuting Mr. Williams. As District 
Attorney, he was responsible for overseeing the 
conduct of trial prosecutors in his office, including 
their compliance with Brady obligations to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. Cf. Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 5.1(a) (1987) (“A partner in the law firm,4
 
 and a 
lawyer who individually or together with other 
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority 
in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
                                                     
4 “‘Firm’ or ‘law firm’ denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law 
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or 
other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers 
employed in a legal services organization or the legal 
department of a corporation or other organization.” Pa. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(c); see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 1.0(c). 
10 
 
Given his professional investment in this case 
and his public accountability to the position of the 
State, the District Attorney could not be impartial 
and neutral when subsequently reviewing the 
conviction his office obtained. See In re Bulger, 710 
F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that a 
reasonable person might question whether a judge 
who bore supervisory responsibility for prosecutorial 
activities during some of the time at issue could 
remain impartial); United States v. Arnpriester, 37 
F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a judge 
who had been the U.S. Attorney, and therefore 
responsible for the entire office, should have recused 
himself from deciding a case that was under 
investigation during his tenure). Chief Justice 
Castille’s decision to hear Mr. Williams’ case thus 
flies in the face of his ethical obligations and the 
requirements of Due Process for a judge to perform 
all duties of judicial office “fairly and impartially,” 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.2, and to 
remain “objective and open-minded,” id. cmt. 1. 
 
B. A fortiori, Chief Justice Castille’s 
judicial involvement in this case 
created the appearance of 
impropriety and partiality. 
 
Judicial impartiality is not only crucial to 
protecting litigants’ Due Process rights, but also in 
maintaining public confidence in the justice system. 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407 (“The legitimacy of the 
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation 
for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”). Indeed, the 
mere questioning of a court’s impartiality “threatens 
the purity of the judicial process and its 
11 
 
institutions.” Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 
F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). As such, 
maintaining the appearance of impartiality is as 
important as impartiality itself. In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. at 136 (“[J]ustice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.”). The test under the Code is 
whether the conduct would create in “reasonable 
minds” a perception that the judge engaged in 
conduct that “reflects adversely on the judge’s 
honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to 
serve as a judge.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 
1.2 cmt. 5. This rigorous standard is necessary 
because the public cannot respect the legitimacy of 
the courts if judges do not act as models of 
independence, integrity, and impartiality.5
 
 
As such, beyond the clear impropriety of Chief 
Justice Castille’s judicial involvement in this case, 
there is an appearance of impropriety so manifest as 
to taint Mr. Williams’ subsequent post-conviction 
proceedings before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
Specifically, when a judge goes from advocating for 
one party to donning the black robe in the same case, 
he not only acts without integrity, but also undercuts 
the public’s perception of judicial neutrality.  
                                                     
5 The ABA urges judges to take considerable precautions when 
they take the bench to ensure that the appearance of judicial 
impartiality is maintained. For example, the ABA opined that 
judges should not allow their former firms to retain their 
names, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, 
Formal Op. 143 (1935), should not receive a percentage of a 
contingency fee for the work they did on a case while employed 
at a firm, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, 
Informal Op. C-676 (1963), and should not receive a fee for 
referring a case to a firm, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 
Grievances, Informal Op. 433 (1961). 
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 The appearance of impropriety will exist 
anytime a prosecutor subsequently presides over his 
case’s appeal.  The impropriety is amplified in this 
case because of the lower court finding that Mr. 
Williams sought to defend on appeal—namely, 
whether the trial prosecutor, who was supervised by 
District Attorney Castille, improperly withheld 
exculpatory evidence. As a result, the government’s 
appeal required Chief Justice Castille to adjudicate 
the propriety of the conduct of an attorney under his 
own leadership and supervision as District Attorney. 
No reasonable person could conclude that Chief 
Justice Castille could impartially evaluate the 
performance of his own colleague, acting under his 
leadership, because that evaluation would require—
both implicitly and explicitly—a judgment of his own 
leadership and supervision. Given Chief Justice 
Castille’s clear personal interest in this case, it is 
difficult to conceive of facts that might cast a greater 
probability of bias or appearance of impropriety.  
 
II. Chief Justice Castille had an affirmative 
obligation to recuse himself because his 
former involvement as a prosecutor in 
Mr. Williams’ case rendered him partial. 
  
 A judge is required to disqualify himself “in 
any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.” Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A). Under both the Code 
and Due Process, the standard in determining 
whether a judge is required to recuse himself is 
objective, focusing not on whether the judge is 
actually biased, but on whether the judge’s 
impartiality might be reasonably questioned. 
13 
 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 (noting that the Court has 
required recusal, where as an objective matter, “the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . 
is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” (internal 
citations omitted)); Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
R. 2.11(A). 
 
 Because his prior involvement in the case as a 
prosecutor rendered him partial, Chief Justice 
Castille was obligated to disqualify himself from this 
case. The Code identifies this precise circumstance 
as requiring disqualification when Rule 2.11 
mandates that a judge recuse himself if he “served 
as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was 
associated with a lawyer in the matter in 
controversy.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 
2.11(A)(6)(a). Thus, even if Chief Justice Castille had 
not played any role in Mr. Williams’ prosecution, he 
would still be barred from hearing this case because 
of his association with the lawyers who did. Rule 
2.11 further mandates that a judge who “served in 
governmental employment, and in such capacity 
participated personally or substantially as a lawyer 
or public official concerning the proceeding” also 
recuse himself. Id at R. 2.11(A)(6)(b). Any one of 
these circumstances obligates a judge to disqualify 
himself, and Chief Justice Castille’s prior 
involvement as District Attorney satisfies all three. 
 
Moreover, the Code stipulates that judges 
cannot sit in review of their own decisions, Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A)(6)(d), and prior 
involvement as a judge on a case necessarily 
disqualifies them from making future rulings that 
could be tainted by their prior knowledge, see In re 
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Murchison, 349 U.S. at 139 (finding a Due Process 
violation when a judge presided at the contempt 
hearing of a witness after serving as the “one-man 
grand jury” out of which the contempt charges 
arose). It would be anomalous to prohibit a judge 
from reviewing his or her previous decision while 
allowing a judge to hear a case that he was 
personally involved in prosecuting, as Chief Justice 
Castille did in Mr. Williams’ case. 
 
Additionally, due to his personal involvement 
in Mr. Williams’ case at the trial level and on direct 
appeal, Chief Justice Castille likely had access and 
was privy to information uncovered during the 
District Attorney’s Office’s investigation, including 
information outside the bounds of what was 
discoverable and introduced at trial. Judges should 
not rely upon, or even consider, information received 
outside the official record because “the reliability of 
that information may not be tested through the 
adversary process.” United States v. Craven, 239 
F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2001). Accordingly, judges are 
obligated to disqualify themselves in cases where 
they have “personal knowledge of facts that are in 
dispute in the proceeding.” Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct R. 2.11(A)(1).  
 
Extrajudicial knowledge is proper grounds for 
recusal because this type of special insight into the 
facts of a case, without more, may prevent a judge 
from impartially weighing the parties’ evidence and 
arguments. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136-39 
(1955) (holding that a judge who held one-man grand 
jury proceedings could not subsequently preside over 
the contempt hearing of a witness in that grand jury 
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because the judge could not free himself from the 
influence of personal knowledge of what occurred in 
the grand jury session); Craven, 239 F.3d at 103 
(disqualifying a sentencing judge who based his 
sentence on an improper ex parte communication 
with a court-appointed expert). It would be “difficult, 
if not impossible, for a judge, no matter how sincere, 
to purge that information from her mind.” Id.  
Here, of course, Chief Justice Castille’s access  
to information went well beyond an ex parte 
communication. 
 
The attempts to defend Chief Justice Castille’s 
role in signing the death penalty authorization 
actually provide a compelling demonstration of the 
impropriety that required Chief Justice Castille to 
recuse himself. This Court has been told that Chief 
Justice Castille’s approval for his subordinates to 
seek the death penalty was an “administrative 
formality.” Resp’t Opp’n Br. to the Pet. for Cert. 11 
n.6. Let us hope not. The decision to seek the death 
penalty must be one of the most profound acts a 
prosecutor can reach. Without this “administrative” 
act by the District Attorney himself, Mr. Williams 
would not be fighting for his life. Moreover, Chief 
Justice Castille himself did not believe such actions 
were routine or trivial when he emphasized the 
number of executions he sought as District Attorney, 
as an important component of his political campaign 
for Chief Justice.  
 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Castille’s 
authorization to seek capital punishment has been 
defended because it did not reflect some form of 
personal animosity toward the defendant. 
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Appellant’s Answer to the Mot. to Recuse, Joint 
Appendix [“J.A.”] at 175a. But this characterization 
misses the point—personal animosity has nothing to 
do with the recusal standards at issue in this case. It 
is more than sufficient that at one time Chief Justice 
Castille was head of the District Attorney’s Office in 
Philadelphia, that he personally authorized the 
seeking of the death penalty, and that the conduct of 
the District Attorney’s Office under his tenure was 
the issue when the appeal from the grant of habeas 
relief came before the Court. These factors alone are 
more than sufficient to disable him from sitting on 
the Court that heard that appeal. 
 
 Disqualification is a critical prescription for 
maintaining impartiality. Rule 1.12(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct requires 
a judge moving from the bench to private practice 
“not [to] represent anyone in connection with a 
matter in which the lawyer participated personally 
and substantially as a judge.” Pa. Rules Prof’l R. 
1.12(a), And when a government lawyer moves to 
private practice, the lawyer is disqualified from 
representing a private client in a matter in which he 
or she had responsibility as a public official. Id. R. 
1.11(a)(2) (explaining that a former government 
lawyer “shall not otherwise represent a private client 
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a public 
officer or employee”); see General Motors Corp. v. 
City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir. 
1974). The same public policy that informs the 
disqualification of a former government lawyer from 
representing a private client in the same matter for 
which he had official responsibility should disqualify 
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him from sitting as judge in the same matter. 
Arnpriester, 37 F.3d at 467-68.  
 
Thus, Chief Justice Castille’s decision not to 
recuse himself was an affront to the bedrock 
principle of an impartial judiciary. The Code does 
not merely list best practices, but instead demands 
that judges act in a manner that maintains the 
public trust in the judiciary. See Caperton, 556 U.S. 
at 889 (explaining that the Model Code and state 
codes of judicial conduct “serve to maintain the 
integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law”). The 
Code not only establishes ethical obligations that are 
binding on judges, but also embodies how judges 
across the country define and understand judicial 
impartiality. In adopting the Code’s provisions 
concerning disqualifications, supreme court judges 
nationwide have agreed that transitioning from 
prosecutor to judge in the same case is improper and 
incompatible with judicial impartiality. 
 
Chief Justice Castille had a clear ethical 
conflict in this case and therefore an obligation to 
recuse himself in the matter. His failure to do so did 
not just create an invidious harm to Mr. Williams, 
but also placed an indelible stain on the legitimacy of 
the judicial system of Pennsylvania. 
 
III. Chief Justice Castille’s partiality and 
impropriety cannot be “cured” by a 
multimember panel.  
 
While this Court has never decided whether a 
multimember panel can “cure” a conflicted judge’s 
participation in any proceeding, let alone one with 
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such high-stakes, the proper answer must be “no.” 
The nature of the multimember panel compounds 
the insidious nature of such impropriety for four 
main reasons. First, when a single conflicted judge is 
allowed to participate in deliberations, he or she 
taints the entire panel’s impartiality with explicit or 
implicit advocacy for one side. Accordingly, the 
conflicted judge’s participation in the panel 
effectively multiplies the impermissible biases and 
ethical violations.  
 
A panel of judges is not intended to be, and is 
not in fact, a collection of individuals screened off 
from communication with one another, each in his  
or her own silo. Instead, multimember panels  
handle appeals in a manner that maximizes the  
benefits of different perspectives, backgrounds, and 
experiences. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Appellate 
Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 Va. 
L. Rev. 255, 281 (1975). It is thus both the 
expectation and the reality that the panel of judges 
will participate together in oral arguments and 
conferences, engage in dialogue designed to persuade 
their fellow judges of their respective views, and 
circulate written opinions in the hopes of convincing 
others to sign on to a particular position. See, e.g., 
A.B.A. Comm’n on Standards of Judicial Admin., 
Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.01 cmt., 
at 9 (1977) (“The basic concept of an appeal is that  
it submits the questions involved to collective 
judicial judgment.”). In short, the very essence  
of the multimember tribunal creates countless 
opportunities for a biased judge to infect his 
colleagues’ perspectives by advocating for his 
impermissible bias during each stage of deliberation. 
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The potential for a multimember panel to be 
tainted by the partiality of a single biased judge is 
not merely a common sense conclusion, but a 
proposition supported by extensive psychological 
literature on group susceptibility to post-deliberation 
attitudinal shifts. The impact of one member’s bias 
on group decisionmaking can enhance that bias’ 
effect. The phenomenon of group polarization occurs 
“when an initial tendency of individual group 
members toward a given direction is enhanced 
following group discussion.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 
110 Yale L.J. 71, 85 (2000). As a result, “groups often 
make more extreme decisions than would the typical 
or average individual.” Id. “Group polarization is 
among the most robust patterns found in 
deliberating bodies,” id., and multiple studies have 
replicated the phenomenon in various contexts, see, 
e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A 
Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 1141 (1986). Furthermore, there is 
growing evidence from studies on multimember 
judicial panels that judges are far from immune from 
this polarization. Sunstein, supra, at 103-04 (citing 
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 
Yale L.J. 2155 (1998); and Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. 
Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997)).  
 
Given this phenomenon, it is clear that 
deliberation does not always produce the golden 
mean of all its members’ attitudes in a way that can 
cancel out bias. Instead, allowing the entry of bias 
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multiplies the risk that the panel will make a more 
extreme decision in the direction of that bias. 
 
Second, when the conflicted judge’s potential 
interests in a proceeding are readily apparent, it is 
extremely difficult for others on the panel to freely 
criticize one side without apprehension that to do so 
will tarnish their relationship with their colleague. 
In this case, the conduct of the District Attorney’s 
Office under Chief Justice Castille’s tenure was the 
central issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. Any reasonable observer would conclude that 
all of the Justices were conflicted because each  
must have considered, either consciously or 
subconsciously, how criticizing the District 
Attorney’s Office in their conferences or the 
circulation of draft opinions would affect their 
rapport with a colleague with whom they deal every 
day. Given each judge’s duty to decide cases 
impartially and objectively, based solely on the 
merits of the arguments introduced by each side, 
such considerations are clearly impermissible.  
 
Again, these concerns are not simply common 
sense assumptions, but are propositions backed by 
an extensive psychological literature on motivated or 
self-interested reasoning. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The 
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 
480, 483 (1990) (“[People] search memory for those 
beliefs and rules that could support their desired 
conclusion. They may also creatively combine 
accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that 
could logically support the desired conclusion. . . . 
The objectivity of this justification construction 
process is illusory because people do not realize that 
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the process is biased by their goals. . . . (emphasis 
added)). Furthermore, unlike the U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, judges in other appeals courts often 
exhibit dissent aversion partly because “the costs in 
impaired collegiality from frequent dissenting” may 
outweigh the benefits. See Lee Epstein, William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (And When) 
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 J. Legal Analysis 101, 135 (2011). 
 
Third, Chief Justice Castille’s role as the Chief 
Justice placed him in a prime position to exert his 
influence through both his administrative power and 
seniority. Specifically, the Pennsylvania Code states 
that “the president judge of a court shall . . . [b]e the 
executive and administrative head of the court, 
supervise the judicial business of the court, 
promulgate all administrative rules and regulations, 
make all judicial assignments, and assign and 
reassign among the personnel of the court available 
chambers and other physical facilities.” Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 325(e)(1). Unlike most judicial decisions, 
which occur in open court and must be explained by 
reasons that are available to public scrutiny, the 
Chief Justice’s exercise of administrative duties in 
large part occurs behind closed doors and is thus less 
constrained by the obligations of accountability and 
is shielded from public scrutiny. Cf. Judith Resnik & 
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: 
Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief 
Justice of the United States, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1575, 
1632 (2006) (describing how the Chief Justice’s 
administrative decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court 
are shielded from the public view). 
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The additional authority vested in the Chief 
Justice may serve as an extraneous consideration, 
either consciously or subconsciously, for the other 
Justices on the panel. As an initial matter, the 
Justices may be concerned that ruining their rapport 
with the Chief Justice will negatively affect many of 
the day-to-day aspects of their work, including the 
opinion writing assignments they receive, their 
chamber space, and their physical facilities. Beyond 
just the potential for inconvenience and annoyance, 
however, the Chief Justice’s administrative powers 
may serve as an additional tool for him or her to 
exert influence over the rest of the Court. See Frank 
B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional 
Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1665, 1667-68 (2006); see also Tracey E. George & 
Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of 
Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox of 
Managerial Judging, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (2008) 
(describing a case in which a Chief Judge 
strategically waited for two of his colleagues to take 
senior status before circulating a petition, so that 
they could not participate).  
 
Indeed, the Chief Justice takes the lead in 
structuring oral arguments and conferences. As 
such, he or she may effectively frame the entire 
proceeding in a manner that is advantageous to his 
or her preferred position by speaking first, setting 
the agenda, and strategically deciding when a vote 
will be taken. Cf. Cross & Lindquist, supra, at 1668-
69; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 
211 Sci. 453, 453 (1981) (discussing how the same 
option may become more attractive or persuasive if it 
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is framed in way that is less threatening to its 
audience). Chief Justice Rehnquist himself explained 
that “what the conference shapes up like is pretty 
much what the [C]hief [J]ustice makes it.” David M. 
O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in 
American Politics 200 (6th ed. 2003). 
 
Even if the administrative powers of the Chief 
Justice have no immediate impact, “the very title of 
‘Chief Justice’ may provide an amorphous source  
of leadership authority. . . . so that a Chief Justice 
generally has an initial psychological advantage over 
the other Justices in a struggle for influence within 
the Court.” Cross & Lindquist, supra, at 1673-74 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Psychological research has demonstrated 
that individuals often voluntarily defer to authority 
figures, sometimes even to the detriment of others or 
themselves.  
 
This basic concept is entrenched in the fields 
of both social and organizational psychology, and it 
has been studied extensively for decades. See, e.g., 
Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social 
Influence: Compliance and Conformity 55 Ann. Rev. 
Psychol. 591, 596 (2004) (“Most organizations would 
cease to operate efficiently if deference to authority 
were not one of the prevailing norms. Yet, the norm 
is so well entrenched in organizational cultures that 
orders are regularly carried out by subordinates with 
little regard for potential deleterious ethical 
consequences of such acts.” (emphasis added)); Tom 
R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational 
Perspective to Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 323, 323 (1997) (“In fact, 
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as the Milgram studies on obedience to authority 
suggested, people often defer to authorities even 
when the actions they must undertake to do so are 
extremely personally aversive.”).  
 
Fourth, it is instructive to review Chief 
Justice Castille’s position that the role of the other 
six Justices cured his ethical violations in light of the 
ethical rules concerning lawyer conflicts of interest 
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Like 
almost every state supreme court, Pennsylvania has 
adopted the full imputation principle enshrined in 
Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules. Pa. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.10. This provision mandates that all 
lawyers in the same law firm are subject to each 
other’s conflicts of interest, and all are equally 
barred from taking on an engagement that creates a 
conflict for any one lawyer in the firm. Id. It does not 
matter whether the lawyer is three thousand miles 
away, is in a different department of the firm, has 
never met the lawyer with the actual conflict, or 
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knows nothing about the matter or the client 
creating the conflict.6
 
  
The principles behind this rule contrast 
sharply with Chief Justice Castille’s view that his 
conflict was not imputed to his colleagues and, 
moreover, that he was permitted to participate fully 
in every aspect of the adjudication. While amici 
applaud the steps the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
took to protect clients from lawyers with conflicts of 
interest, it is the view of amici that, if anything, the 
need to protect litigants from judges with conflicts of 
interest is even more important. Consequently, if 
Chief Justice Castille’s participation in this case is 
left standing, it will be anything but the correct 
result. 
 
One could argue that many of the 
aforementioned threats to impartiality would 
persist, creating a biased panel, even if the Chief 
Justice had recused himself. Even if the Chief 
Justice were screened off from the case, he might 
                                                     
6 Equally instructive is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
adoption of a narrow cure for one specialized type of conflict of 
interest that permits the lifting of imputation. Pennsylvania’s 
conflict imputation rule stipulates that when a lawyer joins a 
new law firm, the conflicts he or she brings to the new law firm 
will not be imputed to others in the firm so long as the new 
lawyer is immediately and fully screened from participation in 
any matter in which he or she would be conflicted, and so long 
as elaborate protocols are instantly instituted to assure that 
the screen is not breached. Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10. 
Contrast that with Justice Castille’s opposing approach of 
bringing his breach of Rule 2.11 to the Court’s adjudicative 
process by ostentatiously taking a full seat at the oral 
argument, the deliberation table, and the drafting and 
production process of the opinion. 
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still be able to exercise his administrative powers 
and intangible influence on the panel in other ways. 
Furthermore, the other Justices, knowing Chief 
Justice Castille’s connection to the District 
Attorney’s Office, might still harbor  
some concern about criticizing the prosecutor’s 
misconduct.  
 
It would be inconceivable, however, to require 
an entire court of last resort to recuse itself. Instead, 
Justices may sit, even if conflicted, in situations 
where their presence is absolutely necessary. See 
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980) 
(reaffirming the “ancient” Rule of Necessity that a 
judge must sit in a case, even if “he has [a] personal 
interest” where the case could not be heard 
otherwise) (emphasis added). This does not, 
however, excuse the behavior of Chief Justice 
Castille or affect the remedy in this case because the 
Chief Justice’s presence was simply not necessary. 
The Code may have to tolerate some conflicts, but it 
does not tolerate impropriety that can easily be 
avoided. Furthermore, because Chief Justice Castille 
is now retired, and new Justices have joined the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there will be no such 
problem on remand. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, a multimember 
tribunal cannot cure the profound conflicts of one 
member. Instead, it provides an incubator for one 
member to spread impermissible and unethical 
biases, either through implicit or explicit advocacy 
within the deliberation process or through the 
creation of an environment where colleagues are 
affected by considerations extraneous to the 
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objective merits of the case. Furthermore, Chief 
Justice Castille’s actual and symbolic authority as 
Chief Justice further intensify his potential to taint 
the entire panel because of the power and influence 
he may possess within the Court. As such, it is clear 
that Chief Justice Castille’s participation in this case 
eviscerated the very concept of impartiality. He 
should not have been permitted to affect his 
colleagues in a way that assaults the principle of 
even-handed justice and violates the Due Process 
rights guaranteed to every individual by the United 
States Constitution. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Chief Justice Castille had both a 
constitutional and ethical obligation to recuse 
himself in this case. His prior involvement as 
District Attorney ensured that he was incapable of 
providing the most basic Due Process right to a fair 
tribunal to Mr. Williams. Moreover, his clear 
disregard for numerous sections of the Code that 
required his recusal left an indelible stain on the 
Pennsylvania judicial system. To make matters 
worse, Chief Judge Castille threatened the 
impartiality of each and every one of his colleagues 
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by hampering 
their ability to decide the case based solely on an 
impartial consideration of the evidence presented. 
Such a blatant disregard of both constitutional 
protections and ethical obligations simply cannot  
be tolerated because of the damage it does  
to individuals like Mr. Williams and to the  
broader community’s need for confidence in the 
independence, impartiality, and fairness of the 
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judiciary. If Chief Justice Castille’s conduct is not 
unconstitutional impropriety itself, amici do not 
know what is. 
 
Respectfully submitted,  
 
Lawrence J. Fox 
Counsel of Record 
127 Wall Street 
New Haven, Connecticut  06511 
(203) 432-9358 
lawrence.fox@yale.com 
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IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE1
 
 
The Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics2
 
 is based at Fordham University School of 
Law and sponsors programs, develops publications, 
supports scholarship on contemporary issues of law 
and ethics, and encourages professional and public 
institutions to integrate moral perspectives into 
their work. Over the past decade, the Stein Center 
and affiliated Fordham Law School faculty  
have examined the ethical dimensions of the 
administration of criminal justice, including issues of 
judicial ethics. 
Leslie W. Abramson is the Frost Brown 
Todd Professor of Law at the Louis D. Brandeis 
School of Law at the University of Louisville. His 
research in the area of judicial ethics is nationally 
known, and he is the co-author of Judicial Conduct 
and Ethics (3d ed. Supp. 2001), and the author of 
Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3 of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct (2d ed. 1992). 
 
Robert H. Aronson is the Betts, Patterson 
and Mines Professor of Law at the University of 
Washington School of Law. He teaches and writes in 
the area of professional responsibility. 
 
                                                     
1 The affiliations of the various amici are for identification 
purposes only and the views expressed in this brief are not 
necessarily the vies of those institutions and firms.  
 
2 The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of 
Fordham University or Fordham Law School.  
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Tigran W. Eldred is a Professor of Law at 
the New England School of Law. His research 
explores the regulation and psychology of decision-
making of lawyers in various contexts, including 
criminal law and legal ethics. He teaches and writes 
in the areas of constitutional and ethical legal 
practice.  
 
Anne S. Emanuel is the Professor of Law 
Emerita at the Georgia State University College of 
Law. She served as Chair of Georgia’s ABA Death 
Penalty Moratorium Implementation Committee 
that culminated in the publication of Evaluating 
Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty 
Systems: The Georgia Death Penalty Assessment 
Report (2006). 
 
Barbara Glesner Fines is the Rubey M. 
Hulen Professor of Law at the University of 
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. Her area of 
focus is professional responsibility. 
 
Lawrence J. Fox is a partner at Drinker 
Biddle & Reath LLP. He is also currently the George 
W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer of Law 
at Yale Law School, teaching ethics and professional 
responsibility, and serves as the supervising lawyer 
for the Ethics Bureau at Yale, one of the law school’s 
student clinics. He was formerly a lecturer in law at 
both Harvard Law School (2007-2010) and the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (2000-2008), 
and has authored many articles and books on 
professional responsibility. He is the former Chair of 
the American Bar Association Standing Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and has 
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served as an advisor for the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers. 
 
Charles Gardner Geyh is the John F. 
Kimberling Professor of Law at the Maurer School of 
Law at Indiana University. He has served as a 
director and consultant to the American Bar 
Association’s Judicial Disqualification Project and as 
a reporter to the Joint Commission to Evaluate the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Commission on 
the 21st Century Judiciary, the Commission on 
Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, and the 
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial 
Independence. In addition, he has served as the 
Director of the American Judicature Society’s Center 
for Judicial Independence. He has written 
extensively in the areas of judicial conduct and 
ethics. 
 
Bruce A. Green is the Louis Stein Professor 
of Law at Fordham Law School, where he directs the 
Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. He teaches 
and writes in the area of legal ethics, and has 
previously served on the American Bar Association 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility. He is currently a member, and a past 
Chair, of the New York State Bar Association’s 
Committee on Professional Ethics. 
 
Mark I. Harrison is a lawyer with Osborn 
Maledon, in Phoenix, Arizona, and chaired the 
American Bar Association Commission to Evaluate 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is also a former 
member of the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional 
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Responsibility, and a former Chair of the Standing 
Committee on Professional Discipline. 
 
Lawrence K. Hellman is the Dean Emeritus 
and Professor of Law at Oklahoma City University 
School of Law. He teaches and writes in the area of 
legal ethics, and has served as Co-Chair of the 
Oklahoma Bar Association’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct Committee. 
 
Donald K. Joseph is a Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law at the Rutgers School of Law-
Camden with professional responsibility as his 
primary focus. Prior to teaching the law, he 
practiced in the litigation department of a major 
Philadelphia law firm for twenty-five years. 
 
Steven Lubet is the Edna B. and Ednyfed H. 
Williams Memorial Professor of Law at the Pritzker 
School of Law at Northwestern University. He 
teaches and writes in the areas of professional 
responsibility and judicial ethics, and is the co-
author of Judicial Conduct and Ethics (5th ed. 
2013).   
 
Susan R. Martyn is the Distinguished 
University Professor and John W. Stoepler Professor 
of Law and Values at the University of Toledo 
College of Law. She is the co-author of Red Flags: A 
Lawyer’s Handbook on Legal Ethics (2d ed. 2010), 
The Ethics of Representing Organizations: Legal 
Fictions for Clients (2009), and Traversing the 
Ethical Minefield: Problems, Law, and Professional 
Responsibility (2d ed. 2008). She has served as  
a member of the American Bar Association  
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Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, as an advisor for the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, and as a 
member of the Ohio Supreme Court Task Force on 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
James E. Moliterno is the Vincent Bradford 
Professor of Law at the Washington and Lee 
University School of Law. He has taught ethics for 
twenty-nine years at six American law schools and 
in eight different countries. He is the author of 
several books on lawyer ethics, including Cases and 
Materials on the Law Governing Lawyers (4th ed. 
2012). 
 
Nancy B. Rapoport is the Garman Turner 
Gordon Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd 
School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. Her specialties include ethics in bankruptcy 
and corporate governance. 
 
James Sample is a Professor of Law at the 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra 
University. He has written several articles about 
judicial ethics and previously served as counsel in 
the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University Law School. 
 
W. Bradley Wendel is a Professor of Law at 
Cornell Law School. He has written extensively in 
the area of legal ethics and has published several 
articles and books, including Impartiality in Judicial 
Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 22 Notre Dame 
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 305 (2008). 
 
6a 
 
Ellen C. Yaroshefsky is the Clinical 
Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Burns 
Center for Ethics in the Practice of Law at the 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva 
Univesity. She teaches a range of courses and 
sponsors programs and events that provoke critical 
thought on issues of legal ethics. 
 
Richard Zitrin is a Lecturer in Law at the 
University of California Hastings College of the Law. 
He is the founding Director of the Center for Applied 
Legal Ethics at the University of San Francisco 
School of Law, a former Chair of the State Bar of 
California Committee on Professional Responsibility 
and Conduct, and the co-author of Legal Ethics in 
the Practice of Law (3d ed. 2006). 
 
